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Abstract
This paper builds a new theory of euro area sovereign bond markets. The theory explains the anomalous bond 
pricing and increasing spreads during the ‘Euro-Crisis’. I show that the malfunctioning of euro area bond markets is 
triggered by asymmetric information and weak reputation in economic and fiscal policy. Both factors trigger a standard 
bond market to turn into turmoil. In the end, those markets are prone to self-fulfilling bubbles due to animal spirits. 
Consequently, mispricing of sovereign debt is inherent in the Eurozone and creates more macroeconomic instability 
than in a stand-alone country.
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Introduction
The European debt crisis poses serious questions on the financial 
theory in general and bond markets in particular. According to standard 
theory bond yields reflect default risk and default risk is determined by 
a number of fundamental variables, such as government debt-to-GDP 
or the current account balance. The standard theory states that a higher 
government debt-to-GDP ratio increases the burden of debt service and 
thus increases the probability of default. Since the beginning of the euro 
crisis in 2010, spreads of government bonds have widened considerably. 
Hence, the high spreads show that investors demand a higher risk 
premium to compensate for the potential default risks of some Eurozone 
member states. However, the increase in spreads has been significantly 
larger than the changes in the underlying fundamentals [1,2]. This 
raises the question of whether markets have just mispriced the current 
risks or orthodox bond theory is not applicable to a monetary union.
Indeed, euro area member states do not have control over their 
own currency. Thus, in contrast to stand-alone countries, they cannot 
guarantee the pay-out of bondholders. It is not remarkable that stand-
alone countries with debt-to-GDP ratios equally high or even higher 
than the indebted European member states were not affected by a 
similar debt crisis. This may be evidence that mispricing of sovereign 
risk is augmented in a currency union. Consequently, government 
bond markets are more fragile and vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises in 
the Eurozone. Such self-fulfilling crises produce multiple equilibriums 
including a kind of trap-equilibrium. The policy lesson is simple: A 
monetary union only works efficient if the institutional rules, i.e. the 
economic and fiscal governance, are based on market incentives or 
imitate the market forces of a stand-alone country [3].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is 
an introduction to the standard bond market and thereafter discusses 
the new elements of the behavioural theory. Section 3 elaborates the 
key mechanisms of the behavioural model in detail. Finally, Section 4 
concludes the paper.
Bond Market: Standard versus Behavioural Theory
This paper provides an in-depth study of euro area bond markets. 
The paper focuses on the bond market turmoil in particular during the 
Euro-Crisis of 2010 [4]. In normal times, bond markets follow standard 
supply and demand determinants. Table 1 summarizes the main supply 
and demand determinants of a standard bond market model. These 
factors determine the bond market equilibrium in normal times [3]. 
However, in times of turmoil the bond market reacts and behaves 
quite differently. I demonstrate within a new behavioural model how 
Eurozone bond markets have behaved during turmoil.
European sovereign bond markets are unique due to country-
specific characteristics and the supranational monetary framework. 
As a matter of fact, every euro area country still has its own bond 
market based on the sovereignty of national fiscal policy. Thus, bond 
pricing is primarily based on domestic fundamentals such as public 
deficit, debt, current account balance, and growth prospects. However, 
the institutional linkage to the supranational framework, especially 
monetary policy, eliminates several important market incentives. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) sets a common interest rate for 18 euro 
area countries and thus triggers either positive or negative stimulus 
depending on the domestic stage of the business cycle. As opposed to 
the national central banks, the supranational ECB is the only institution 
that is able to guarantee the pay out of euro debt obligations. This unique 
interplay between national fiscal policy and supranational monetary 
policy characterizes the sovereign bond markets in Europe. In times 
of turmoil, the division between domestic fiscal policy and European 
monetary policy is an important vulnerability.
A comparison to highly indebted G7 member states such as Japan, 
the UK, and the US, reveals that euro area countries are less flexible 
and more exposed to sudden market reversals. On average, despite high 
An Increase in Demand Curve shifts to the Supply Curve shifts to the
 Standard Theory
Behavioural 
Theory
Standard 
Theory
Behavioural 
Theory
Deficit and 
Debt level Left and down Left and up Right and down Right and down
Expected 
inflation rate Left and down Left and up Right and down Right and down
Riskiness of 
bond Left and down Left and up - -
Expected 
interest rate Left and down Left and up - -
Liquidity of 
bond Right and up Right and down - -
Wealth Right and up - - -
Slope of 
Curve Downward Upward Upward Upward
Table 1: Properties of Standard versus Behavioural Theory.
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debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP levels, individual euro area countries 
cannot shape possible bond buying programs or implement public 
support for a country because of prohibition in European law. In fact, 
Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
prohibits monetary financing, while Article 125 (the so-called “no-
bailout clause”) prohibits any support for or bailout of other countries. 
This challenge does not exist in Japan, the UK, or the US. In addition, 
the US benefits from the unique safe haven status of the US dollar.
In 2010, financial markets have reassessed the creditworthiness of 
several euro area countries [4]. However, the relatively abrupt reversal 
of sovereign yields has produced a situation similar to a bank run, but 
in the sovereign bond market. Spreads have increased considerably 
and caused unprecedented turmoil for euro area countries. These self-
reinforcing effects are highly contagious, creating temporary liquidity 
problems and evolving into an enduring solvency crisis.
The following behavioral theory develops a new model to 
understand this particular tipping point in the sovereign bond markets 
of the euro area [Figure 1]. It is obvious that the fundamentals, such 
as the long-term sustainability of public finances, the current account 
balance, and economic growth rates, are insufficient to explain the euro 
crisis in general [4]. It is difficult to understand why the market reaction 
was negligible in countries with similar or even higher deficit and debt 
levels, such as the UK, the US, or Japan. Therefore, I have to take into 
account further vulnerabilities to explain bond market reversals in 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). I propose the following three 
vulnerabilities:
Asymmetric Information: Countries with weak fundamentals 
and whose governance and accounting systems lack transparency and 
credibility generate high levels of asymmetric information. In the end, 
that may trigger market concerns and subsequently market turmoil. 
The economic mechanism is as follows: an increase in asymmetric 
information increases the transaction cost and reduces the liquidity 
effect of bonds. Consequently, the bond price drops and the yields rise 
considerably. 
Political Reputation: Although the degree of asymmetric 
information together with the fundamentals is decisive, it does not 
sufficiently explain the sudden reversals in some euro area countries. 
The second relevant trigger in bond markets is the degree of political 
reputation. Countries that express sufficient willingness to undertake 
structural reforms, such as those designed to regain competitiveness 
or towards fiscal sustainability, have a good reputation. Hence, 
good reputation helps to diminish market concerns about the 
respective sovereign bond quality and thus default risk. However, bad 
fundamentals, together with no commitment lead to weak reputation 
and to a self-reinforcing downward spiral. As long as policymakers 
show no willingness to undertake needed structural reforms, countries 
will lose their reputation. The loss of reputation triggers a tipping point, 
too. 
Animal Spirits: Last but not least, both mechanisms are gradual 
and generate a vicious circle due to animal spirits. In other words, some 
people follow the old and some the new risk assessment. Thus, the 
agent’s behaviour matters and may lead to market exaggerations. 
Thus, the new elements of the behavioural European bond market 
theory are asymmetric information, political reputation as well as 
animal spirits. These elements have a substantial effect on the European 
bond market dynamics. Asymmetric information and political 
reputation trigger a sudden loss in market confidence with a race to 
the bottom due to animal spirits. Weak reputation and high levels of 
asymmetric information impair the quality, liquidity and riskiness of 
bonds. In other words, market turmoil lowers the price and demand 
due to bad quality assets. This is contrary to normal markets, where 
demand for a bond increases with lower prices. Consequently, in market 
turmoil the bond demand curve becomes upward-sloping. An upward-
sloping demand curve sounds strange, however it is not uncommon. 
In 2001, Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz received the Nobel Prize in the 
following paragraphs, I develop the idea of an upward-sloping demand 
curve in the European bond markets in turmoil. First I assume that the 
level of the sovereign yields is characterised by economic and financial 
fundamentals in the respective country according to the model 
[Figure 1]. Higher yields indicate always higher risks. In other words, 
a higher yield indicates a less sound situation and thus a higher default 
risk. However, risk and return is only linked positively as long as the 
country is solvent and able to repay its debt obligations in future. Thus, 
there exists a tipping point in the Eurozone due to the institutional 
constraints at which the default probability is so high that a high yield 
is unable to compensate for the prospective default. At that point, bond 
demand declines despite high yields. Figure 2 illustrates this new idea 
graphically.
The region below the tipping point depicts the situation of normal 
markets. Above the tipping point, bond markets are in turmoil. This 
market environment reflects a “liquidity aversion” in which bond 
supply is greater than demand and hence yields are extremely high. In 
normal markets, the investor is in search of yields and purchases bonds 
that are almost safe assets (low default probability) but offer a relatively 
high rate of return. These are points close, but below the tipping point. 
As an unforeseen event occurs or the policymakers lose credibility and 
reputation, these countries jump to the top segment of this demand 
schedule. This implies that despite higher yields, the demand of assets 
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Figure 1: Structure of Behavioural Model.
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Figure 2: Bond Demand in Different Market Environments.
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is equal or lower. Thus, it result a demand shortage or a “liquidity 
aversion.” In this market environment investors start the search for 
safety [5]. Of course this is sometimes a gradual process and therefore 
animal spirits, the 3rd element in my model is important, too.
Using this new idea, it is simple to derive the respective bond 
demand curve in normal markets as well as in market turmoil. The 
demand curve in normal markets is characterized by the upward-
sloping segment. The demand curve in turmoil is characterized by the 
downward-sloping part. It remains to be shown that the bond demand 
curve, which is a price-quantity relationship, follows the behavioural 
model. I illustrate this feature in Figure 3.
In Figure 3, I construct the respective demand curves within the 
4-quadrant system. The first quadrant on the top-right side illustrates 
the two different demand curves and they will be derived based on the 
model assumptions. The bold downward-sloping curve depicts demand 
in normal markets. The dotted upward-sloping curve demonstrates 
demand in turmoil. In the second quadrant on the top-left, I have a 
45°-line that is needed for construction purposes. The third quadrant 
on the bottom-left illustrates the assumed positive relation between the 
price and quality of an asset. The most important feature is depicted in 
the fourth quadrant. This is the critical ingredient for the construction 
process of the two demand curves. Without the loss of generality, I 
assume non convex curves. The dotted curve depicts the situation of 
market turmoil according to the model in Figure 2. Thus, in market 
turmoil the demand for bonds with high quality increases significantly 
despite low yields. Indeed, this pattern – the flight to safety such as 
German Bunds – has appeared in the European sovereign debt crisis in 
2010. Given this relationship, everyone can see how the upward-sloping 
dotted demand curve, through points A and B in quadrant I, results 
by construction in the behavioural model. The solid curve depicts the 
situation of normal markets respectively. In normal markets, investors 
have confidence and they are in search of yields. Hence, there is still 
a high demand for assets with high yields. This results in a standard 
downward-sloping demand curve through points X and Y.
Mechanisms of the Behavioral Model
As illustrated above, under asymmetric information and weak 
political reputation the demand curve slopes upward. Figure 4 
utilizes this idea and discusses the new equilibrium effects. If the 
upward sloping demand curve has a slope steeper than the supply 
curve, a new equilibrium of market turmoil, EMT, exists. But there is 
a second equilibrium, EF, at the intersection of the still downward-
sloping demand curve with bad fundamentals and the supply curve. 
The difference between both equilibria is that the equilibrium EF 
captures normal markets with just bad fundamentals. On the contrary, 
equilibrium EMT reflects market turmoil. In market turmoil, we obtain 
both bad fundamentals and either asymmetric information or weak 
political reputation. These elements trigger that normal markets turn 
into turmoil. Thereafter, we get a gradual re-assessment of the bond 
quality that follows animal spirits, the final part in my behavioural 
model [Figure 1].
If the bond market switches from normal into turmoil, some 
investors stick to their previous assessment and thus still follow a 
standard (downward-sloping) demand curve. However, some investor’s 
respond immediately with a new assessment, i.e. higher expected 
default risk. Consequently, the behavioural model has an ‘upward-
sloping’ demand curve during market turmoil and behaves differently 
than in standard theory. As a result this behavioural model gets multiple 
equilibria [Figure 4].
According to Figure 4, the bond market with just bad fundamentals 
still behaves like a normal bond market. The respective demand 
curve (BDF) shifts to the left as indicated by the determinants in Table 
1. However, the behavioural bond market, proposed in my model, is 
different. Asymmetric information and political reputation change 
the slope of the demand curve and affect the determinants that shift 
the new behavioural demand curve (BDMT). Table 1 summarises the 
demand and supply determinants as well as the factors that shift the 
curves in the standard and behavioural theory. Overall, the behavioural 
model demonstrates a far richer and sophisticated pricing dynamics of 
euro area bond markets.
During the European sovereign debt crisis, there was strong 
empirical evidence in line with this new behavioural model. Bond 
yields of countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal increased 
dramatically, despite having similar or even better fundamentals than 
other countries. We argue that asymmetric information and political 
reputation problems in these countries are mainly responsible for the 
sudden and intense reversals. As a result, there are more bonds with 
bad quality in the market and the quality of assets matters significantly 
in a behavioural model.
Herzog and Müller [6] find evidence that the quality of financial 
assets in the Eurozone is a new vulnerability due to different degrees 
in asymmetric information and political reputation. They computed 
a ‘Political Risk Index’ (PRI) which highlights countries with a large 
degree of asymmetric information and weak reputation in fiscal and 
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Figure 3: Construction of Bond Demand Curves
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Figure 4: Standard and Behavioural Bond Market.
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economic policy. The index number ranges from 1.0 to 6.0, i.e. from 
very sound to very unsound countries respectively. Not surprisingly, 
Greece and Italy show the worst performance of the PRI of 6.0 and 
5.5 respectively. Consequently, to tackle the European debt crisis with 
austerity measures on the one hand and with ‘technocratic’ governments, 
such as in Italy led by Mario Monti, on the other hand is an appropriate 
response to restore confidence. Of course, all this mitigates – but does 
not solve – the asymmetric information and reputation problem. At 
the same time, countries have to undertake structural reforms to get 
back their competitiveness and policymakers have to design an efficient 
fiscal and economic governance system in the Eurozone [7].
Conclusion
This paper develops a behavioural and thus new bond market 
theory for the Eurozone. I find that euro area bond markets are 
different because of the institutional setup of the EMU. First, member 
countries have fiscal authority without monetary authority. Thus, 
Eurozone member states cannot guarantee payment of bondholders in 
all cases. Second, a monetary union reduces the incentive to maintain 
sustainable finances despite the existence of the no-bailout clause 
and the Stability and Growth Pact. Consequently, this creates latent 
disconnect between market fundamentals and the respective yield. The 
key trigger mechanisms are asymmetric information and/or political 
reputation. Finally, animal spirits amplify the market reversals and 
they are leading to self-reinforcing crises. Thus, the behavioural model 
provides valuable insight for all financial investors in Europe.
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